加拿大开通GOOG-411服务, 只需拿起电话, 拨打1-800-466-4411即可连线google搜索.
经过本人测试, 语音识别准确, 连接速度快, 快捷便利.
不过针对手机的text msg和map it服务好像还不成功.

拨打吧, 现在这样已经很不错了, 从此在户外google不用电脑了.

由于价钱未谈拢, M$近期宣布放弃收购Yahoo计划, 导致yahoo周一开盘$24不到, 大大低于上周五收盘价$28.67.

yahoo现在压力巨大, 管理层必须向股东证明拒绝微软收购提议的决定是有道理的, 并且证明其可以为股东创造出比微软的收购报价更高的价值. Yahoo目前最重要的事是在是否与google达成广告外包协议的问题上做出抉择, 当然, 无论如何yahoo管理层所作出的任何决定都无法在收益上达到立竿见影的效果, 相反将顶着压力经历一系列漫长的等待过程.

yahoo拥有Alibaba 39%股份, 在yahoo本身紧张的时刻, alibaba的股价也见势下跌, 今日开盘较上周五收盘下跌巨幅达6.7%, 可见外界对yahoo拒绝被收购的决定使人在面对alibaba的态度上持连带怀疑. 据传上周M$准备提高价格收购Yahoo的消息使alibaba狂飙12%, 可以看出大家对强强联合还是很有希望的.

如今尘埃落定, let's say goodbye to MicroHoo.

盼了好久终于出了中文版, 如果你关注中国财经股市, Google财经将是桌面软件之外的第一选择.
由于目前仍是测试版, 所以没有和Google Account联系, 以至于无法配置Personal Portfolio, 相信在今后的开发中,各个功能会被陆续加上.

看了牛人邵亦波关于股份vesting的文章, 受益匪浅, 同时还是不太明朗.原文如下

说创始人的股份Vesting。Vesting这个词没有好的翻译，用例子先来解释，再说它的好处。

公司发行2,000,000股，创始人甲乙两人，各有1,000,000股。其中，20%，即200,000股，在公司创始时，就马上vest，公司以后不能回购。剩下800,000股，分四年vest。

如果甲一年后离开的话，他会拿到200,000股，加上创始时的200,000股，共400,000。剩下的600,000被公司以象征性价格回购。公司总股份量变为1,400,000。甲占有4/14 = 29%；乙占有 10/14 = 71%。和和气气，公共平平。

如果没有事先谈定vesting的话，甲离开时，会与乙有很大的争吵。甲会说“我已为公司做了很大的贡献，我的1,000,000股应该都是我 的”。乙一定反对。最后甲会说 “反正已经是我的了，看你怎么办”。乙会说，“这样太不公平，那我也不做了”，或，“那我把这个公司关掉，重启炉灶。”争吵继续升级，还会出现偷公司公 章，抢钥匙，上法院，等等。我都见过。可以想象，公司的员工和业务，会受到的影响。

Vesting还有另外一个好处：如果甲乙出现股份多少的纠纷（比如一年以后，乙的贡献或重要性比甲多），也比较容易解决。董事会与甲乙商量后做决 议，把双方的还没有vest的股份重新分配。甲乙都会比较容易接受，因为已经vest的股份不变。而且如果一方不接受的话，离开公司，也有一个明确公平的 已经vest的股份。

Vest是一个很公平的方法，因为创业是一个艰苦的多年过程，而不是一个主意。主意本身，没有相信它的人充满热情，放弃一切的做，是没有什么价值的。

没有经历过股份纠纷的创业者，即使了解上一段，同意它是公平的，都不喜欢vesting，因为怕被投资者炒鱿鱼，失去股份。经历过股份纠纷的创业者，会在投资者进来以前，就和合作伙伴商量好vesting。

那么,

1， 若4年后无人离开，这个东西从第5年开始就没有意义，而需要从新制定规则？

2，“剩下的600,000被公司以象征性价格回购。公司总股份量变为1,400,000。” 是不是理解为$600,000(公司回购) + $800,000(乙未vest的股份)

3，如果创始人甲一年之后离开，接下来乙也只做了三年，没有满约定的四年。乙第三年底的时候将公司卖了一个好价钱，那时候如何分配卖了之后的利润？

4，Vesting这个词在中文里做何解？有无详细解释及案例分析？

希求达人给予解答， 多谢多谢！

Ars Technica上的一篇文章中对Firefox 3 Beta 4和其他最新浏览器进行了对比测试。FF3B4的对手包括 IE7，Firefox 2，Opera 9.5 Beta 和 Safari 3.0.4 Beta。测试结果显示，Firefox 3 Beta 4的内存使用效率最高，它甚至在测试中超过了Opera，这个被长时间来看做是最快的浏览器。

我始终认为核心技术与人才资金的合理搭配在正确的市场决策下是成功终极方案.
　　
　　 史玉柱则告诉大家没有喝过脑白金的IT人是没有资格跟巨人挑战的.
　　
　　 一句"魔兽世界勉强60分"能招来Frank Pearce. 希望Frank Pearce在玩巨人之前先摆两瓶脑白金以备游戏中心力脑力精力衰竭不时之需.
　　
　　 面对史玉柱日趋严重的宋祖德化, 我的内心巴凉巴凉的.......难道他就没有照顾到一点国人的面子吗?
　　
　　refer:
　　http://www.cnbeta.com/articles/50819.htm
　　http://www.cnbeta.com/articles/51260.htm
　　http://www.cnbeta.com/articles/51266.htm

有需求就有供应, 华硕在面对用户对原本eeepc内置Linux的不满意的普遍情况下最终还是发布搭载WinXP的版本.

此为Windows XP Home, 内含Windows Works软件包, 其中有Works Word Processor、Works Spreadsheet、Works Database、Works Power Point Viewer、Works Calendar、Works Address Book等软件.

记者在发布现场看到一个很有趣的现象, 总共4G的硬盘, 用了3G多, 剩下不到700MB, 话说刚刚好是一张CD的容量.

也许你会说, 干, 那么小的空间拿来干什么?! 不会只叫我放文本文件吧.

哎~~各位看官听好, 假如只安装Clean版本Windows, 大概只要3g, 本来已经紧张的硬盘到现在就所剩无几, 华硕不仅没有削减组件反而加上好多, 这就是华硕的猫腻了.

华硕这样做有他们的理由:
1, 别忘了, 4G版本只是基础eeepc, 还有高级版本不仅有8G硬盘还带个摄像头. (价钱甭操心, 因为就是要宰你.)
2, 华硕在eeepc上装个读卡器可不是摆设, 自己不生产SD卡并非代表他们不生产USB硬盘以及和SD厂商没有暧昧关系和股份利益. 别看小小易PC,早在发布初期就被认定是拉动存储卡的主要动力.
3, 私自删减XP组件达到真正"精简版XP"是消费者最愿意看到的, 也是网络上最流行的解决方案, 华硕不是技术上不行, 而是觉得多一事不如少一事, 删掉众多组件会不会侵犯到微软版权问题我不清楚, 但是加装软件不仅是借消费者的花献了微软这佛, 更能推动存储设备消费, 何乐不为呢?

2年前，有人造谣说要出Xbox 360外置蓝光播放器了。 讽刺的是，2年后，这个谣言似乎就要成真了。微软官方的蓝光播放器最早会在5月和大家见面。据Smarthouse报道，他们的微软内线透露，独立蓝光播 放器已经开始生产了，在合适的时机合适的地点发布一下，3个月后上市。至于直接搭载蓝光光驱的360，尚在研发中，发售时间不详。

这个消息还是很让人震惊的，微软可真会见风使舵啊。

Nick和Adam原本是同班的两个好同学, 且真强好斗, 一天Adam被美女Amanda领回家当了儿子, 从此过上被管束的生活, 两年不到的时间, Nick发育了, 说要娶Amanda为妻, Adam心里挺不是滋味儿.............这叫乱伦.
今儿就在唯恐天下不乱的谣言高手cnBeta那里看到"分析师称NVIDIA有可能收购AMD", 这应该就叫乱购吧.  小安前两天回帖说"不要管大市怎样，买进你分析后认为低于市值的股票。" 那谁来帮忙分析分析假如Nvidia真有收购意向, 各家的市值该怎么算法.

不知道该把那篇文归为听风是雨还是恶意标题党, 总之大家都按耐不住. 回复还挺有趣"分析师称NVDIA有可能收购剩余艳照","分析师称中国有可能收购美国", "intel再收购NVIDIA就可以了" .........囧rz

相信是本年度最大新闻.
为继续在网络广告战中能够追赶上Google,微软周五宣布将以446亿美元的价格收购雅虎.受此消息的推动,雅虎股价周五在纳斯达克市场盘前交易中上涨了59%.
假如我们说全世界IT市场原先是三足鼎立的局面:Google, Microsoft 和 Yahoo! .那么现在将会出现两大阵营对立: Microsoft/Yahoo! 与 Google. 本次收购计划将会彻底改变市场格局,Google面临前所未有的压力. 据称微软处心积虑等了Yahoo一年时间,最终Yahoo被确定收购, 微软将占领网络大笔资源, 并进行新开发,研究新市场战略, 发掘市场资源, 虽然现在Google稳居搜索市场第一把交椅, 如稍有不慎, 将被微软后来居上, 届时整个市场将分崩离析.
作为Google支持者, 我还是对Google保持100%信心. 最大原因: 本人认为, 市场固然是重要资源, 但是IT最终靠的还是技术, 谁会笑到最后,就是看谁的技术尖端,谁的经营手段高明.
报道完毕, 各位想入NASDAQ:YHOO请尽快,还有上升空间.

上周百度日本发布新闻招待会,从此正式成立上线.

官方博客将此事报道地光鲜亮丽充满希望. 百度日本员工有30人,全部为日本人, 将负责设计需求, 而国内人员负责技术开发,以符合日本特色.

客观一点看, 把百度放到一个完全陌生的环境里, 没有政府保障, 没有厚重低端用户群,加上在言论自由环境里国际品牌(Google & Yahoo)本土品牌的咄咄紧逼的形势, 这个名不见经传的小百度该如何应付.

国内的谷歌由于是众所周知的阉割版, 加上各项周边服务被和谐, 所以出现暂时落后百度的局面, 百度便自恃强大开始进军日本. 个人感觉有点不自量力.

讽刺的是官方博客里提高要打造高端服务, 难道他们就不知道在国内的百度至于谷歌就好比QQ之于MSN吗? 低端用户才是他们的着力点, 生于低端, 发达于低端, 你如何去提供高端服务?! 就好象是中国汽车大张旗鼓准备进军国际市场, 人家底特律车展就是把中国汽车一律放在地下展厅展出, 所以就算你进去国际市场,你也是国际市场的低端产品, 而且初期还要承受别人鄙夷的目光. 当然, 出发点是好的, 道路也是曲折的.

最后讽刺的一点是, 百度高调进入日本市场, 借国内影响力号召网民去捧场, 可是呢, 有GFW在,谁也进不去, 所谓,不带套,上不了百度.

原以为坚挺的中国股市一向秉承有中国特色的社会主义路线, 不会被美帝股市左右.

谁都没有料到.

开盘下跌10%, 收盘全面跌停!


原以为下跌是成震荡走势, 好让我也看看惨烈并优美的曲线是如何落向谷底.

妈的谁都没有料到.

原来是直线下跌,零度哦~不带拐弯的.


原以为股评是个好东西,为我在黑夜里寻找光明,带我走向希望.

娘的谁都没有料到.

昨天还说今天股市是关键的"涨幅突破点,必会反弹!!", 今天收盘了马上又说"大暴跌揭秘及应对之策!" ,去你老木......

北美大盘指数5天走势


上证大盘指数5天走势


中国就是顽强顽强顽强!!!!!往上窜窜窜!!!!!!
还是说泡沫就是坚不可摧,就是不破不破不破......

中国是个奇怪的地方.

让我非常费解的是,为什么Apple主推的所有产品都有如此众多的追捧者,产生如此大的羊群效应.Macbook Air无非是薄一点的notebook,而且是以牺牲性能为代价换取来的.甚至当纽约时报记者在询问配置性能情况时,Jobs干脆直接回答"也许这个机型不适合你". 那么用户追求的到底是性能配置还是时尚设计?尽管众多厂商在两者权衡方面做了无数尝试,终究没有Air那么受欢迎.

难道是Steve Jobs的个人魅力? Apple与厂商间的协调关系? 抑或Mac OS本身? 还是苹果铁杆fans的推波助澜?

是否印证一点:产品本身并不能决定销售.

很想把这句话送给准备登陆北美的中国汽车.

Sun Microsystems今天早上公布了以8亿美元的现金和2亿美元期权收购开源数据库领导者MySQL AB的计划.
Sun微系统称,公司将以8亿美元的现金和MySQL的所有股票,并将MySQL提供价值约2亿美元的期权.Sun微系统称,MySQL的客户已包括了 Google、Facebook以及诺基亚等大公司,通过收购不仅将有助于增强公司的数据库产品线,而且还将增强公司在包括数据库市场的企业IT市场中的 地位.通过收购MySQL,将使公司在价值150亿美元的数据库市场实现质的飞跃,并有助于公司同微软、IBM和甲骨文等竞争对手进行抗衡.

此收购事件应该是本年度IT界第一超级重磅炸弹. 各位同学如果在北美股市有开户,请尽快认购NASDAQ:JAVA, 120%涨, 宜早不宜迟,晚了就赚不到钱啦.

被套牢了, 所以有了责任感, 肩膀上的担子重了;
被套牢了, 所以学会关心, 每天都会去看看;
被套牢了, 所以学会忍耐, 很多事情必须慢慢来;
被套牢了, 所以开始自我检查, 每次出问题要先从自身找原因;
被套牢了, 所以学会坚持, 除了坚持就没有希望, 那只能坚持;

爱上被套,把我套牢吧.套得我屁滚尿流哭爹喊娘天昏地暗痛不欲生, 让我体会世人的酸楚......

...
...
...

那么, 最后请别忘了反弹, 谢谢!

I didn't know I was a surveillance target until the day I walked into a hotel in China's Fujian province. I was pushing past half a dozen workmen changing lightbulbs in the glum but busy lobby when a uniformed man stepped in front of me. Blue jacket, creased trousers, braided epaulets, peaked cap: government security officer. Politely, he asked whether I would mind answering a few questions. He stood erect, with the manicured swagger of a corporate CEO. Next to him, a gangly plainclothes colleague gave me a so-you-thought-we-wouldn't-catch-you look.

How had they known I would be here? The only people who had my itinerary were my editors in London. A few days earlier, I had sent them an email outlining my trip, and I'd been updating them daily by phone. I could only assume that the authorities had been monitoring my email and calls. I had been chasing down leads on the whereabouts of Lai Changxing, China's most-wanted man. Lai had cheated the government out of $3.6 billion by smuggling oil, cars, and cigarettes. Embarrassed, Beijing wanted to hinder any reporting of his case.

The two officers in the hotel demanded to see my passport and asked what I knew about Lai. Then they withdrew to a corner of the lobby to confer. Eventually, they took me to a police car, drove me to the airport, and put me on a plane to Beijing.

It was, in short, impressive evidence of the government's ability to monitor and control electronic communication. And my experience only hinted at the Chinese government's appetite for control. Beijing has recently added a new weapon to its arsenal of surveillance technologies, a system it believes to be a modern marvel: the Golden Shield. It took eight years and $700 million to build, and its mission is to "purify" the Internet — an apparently urgent task. "Whether we can cope with the Internet is a matter that affects the development of socialist culture, the security of information, and the stability of the state," President Hu Jintao said in January.

The Golden Shield — the latest addition to what is widely referred to as the Great Firewall of China — was supposed to monitor, filter, and block sensitive online content. But only a year after completion, it already looks doomed to fail. True, surveillance remains widespread, and outspoken dissidents are punished harshly. But my experience as a correspondent in China for seven years suggests that the country's stranglehold on the communications of its citizens is slipping: Bloggers and other Web sources are rapidly supplanting Communist-controlled news outlets. Cyberprotests have managed to bring about an important constitutional change. And ordinary Chinese citizens can circumvent the Great Firewall and evade other forms of police observation with surprising ease. If they know how.

Like its namesake, the Great Firewall consists of hundreds of individual fortifications spread out along a vulnerable frontier. At its core is a giant bank of computers and servers. Traffic generated by China's 162 million Internet users is routed through the shield, which checks all requested URLs against a blacklist of tens of thousands of Internet addresses. The list includes pages offering political information deemed dangerous by the government, like BBC News and Voice of America. Access to these sites is blocked (at least in theory), and when users attempt to view one of them, they are punished with an involuntary time-out lasting anywhere from 30 seconds to 30 minutes. Search engines are similarly restricted. If you enter the characters for "democracy" or "Tiananmen Square massacre" into Google.cn you will generally get zero results. This is a technological breakthrough for the Chinese government. Until recently, it could not interfere with the inner workings of search engines and instead blocked entire sites, not just individual pages of a site.

The Golden Shield hardware — supplied by Cisco and other US companies — is supplemented by human censors who are paid about $170 a month. They sit at screens in warehouse-like buildings run by the Public Security Bureau. These foot soldiers in China's information war monitor domestic news sites, erasing and editing politically sensitive stories. Some sites provide the censors with access so the authorities can alter content directly. Others get an email or a call when changes are required. Similar methods are applied to blogs. Sensitive entries are erased, and in the most egregious cases blogs are shut down altogether.

The censors also monitor email traffic, looking for politically sensitive content like calls for protest marches and anti-government tracts. Because it would be impossible to screen millions of Internet users, they home in on watchlists of potentially suspicious emailers — known dissidents, suspicious foreigners — and notify investigators of possible violations.

Information spied online is collected in counties and major cities and matched up with other surveillance data. In my case, the effectiveness of this technique was obvious. Police minders always seemed to know where I was traveling and when I was back in Beijing. Sometimes they'd call as soon as I landed at the airport, telling me I had yet again broken the rules by traveling without permission or conducting interviews without authorization.

Evading them, however, was surprisingly easy. I bought additional phone numbers, a tactic I picked up from Lai. I also learned dozens of tricks to avoid arousing suspicion online. But the cat-and-mouse game was unrelenting. A year before my book on Lai was published, I told an official about it. Maybe I mixed up my tenses, mistakenly suggesting I had already finished it. "Yes," the official said. "I enjoyed the book." I was too stunned to ask how he might have got his hands on the still-incomplete manuscript. But then, I didn't really have to: When I had arrived at my office in Beijing one morning some eight weeks earlier, I had found the cables on my computer changed around. The modem wire was rolled up in a coil, the power cable unplugged, and the printer attached to the wrong port. It appeared someone had been poking around my hard drive. When I lifted up the computer to fix the mess, I found a piece of paper. On it was my office address, written in an unfamiliar scrawl.

For all its ambition, the gears of the giant surveillance machine keep getting fouled with sand. On one side of the Great Firewall, a small industry is sprouting up, dedicated to evading blocks and monitors. Libertarian software engineers, enterprising students, banned religious groups, and regular for-profit companies compete with one another to launch new downloadable tools that outfox the censors. They exploit proxy servers, deploy encryption technology, and ferret out holes in the wall. I have spent many afternoons in the Internet cafés of Beijing's Haidian University district, learning from the students who live in this world. For a dollar an hour, they will help anyone hack the system: set up secure SSH and VPN connections, use a circumvention tool called UltraSurf developed by the banned Falun Gong group, access unregulated Chinese peer-to-peer networks. Their techniques confirm John Gilmore's adage: "The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it."

From these students I learned that censorship is not only easy to subvert, but sometimes it subverts itself. Each week, for example, Beijing's propaganda department updates a list of banned stories. Available to senior journalists at government-controlled news outlets, the list includes scandals, protests, and sackings across the country. Newspapers are not allowed to report on them, but some journalists post the lists online, telling you all you need to know.

The system is self-defeating in other ways as well: Twelve national government bodies share responsibility for the Internet, and all of them have separate political and commercial interests. In some cases, departmental budgets are financed through revenue from online businesses, so it's often in their interests to loosen restrictions. Furthermore, the Great Firewall is besieged by bureaucratic infighting and incompetence that results in exceptions and loopholes.

One day, I received an official summons from the Public Security Bureau, asking me to present myself at the national headquarters. When I turned up, I saw hundreds of bikes covered in dust, as if their riders had gone into the building and never come out.

I was met by two uniformed officers who led me to a windowless room. They came straight to the point: Had I been in touch with Wang Dan, an exiled dissident living in Boston? Yes, I said. I had exchanged emails with him — but had not yet published a story (so how did they know?). Was I aware, they continued, of the rule requiring foreign journalists to ask for official permission to interview Chinese citizens? "Yes," I said. Then the conversation took an unexpected turn. "There is a problem," I told the officers. "Wang Dan has become an American citizen." The officers were silent. "In the future," I said, "which government department should I ask for permission to email and interview him?" Confused and sheepish, they let me leave, and I found myself back by the dusty bikes. So these were the bureaucrats guarding the mighty Great Firewall? Even police departments working in the same building were not talking to each other. Otherwise they would have known that Wang Dan was in fact still carrying a Chinese passport, as I later found out.

Government attempts to suppress coverage of another persona non grata, Lai Changxing, were equally futile. Although excised from the official state media, Lai was well-covered by dozens of Web sites. Hunted by the government, he was cheered on anonymously online. Bloggers compared him to the characters in All Men Are Brothers, a 12th-century book of tales about outlaws who outwit greedy, abusive officials. "Lai is like an ancient bandit," I read on a discussion board. "He only takes from the rich."

After almost two years underground, Lai eventually sought asylum in Canada. Again, independent Web sites carried the news. "Lai has a million-dollar home in Vancouver," was the headline on one site. At this point, newspapers gave up their silence and began to report on the Lai case, too. New media was drawing away millions of readers, so newspaper owners lobbied censors and officials to give them more leeway to defend their commercial interests.

As Chinese citizens become aware that their most potent advantage over censorship is their sheer numbers, more and more grievances are aired online — sometimes with significant consequences. The first cyber-rebellion to have a major political impact took place in 2003. Sun Zhigang, a young migrant worker in Guangzhou, died in police detention after failing to produce identity documents during a street check. Sun's friends protested his death on discussion boards, and soon other sites picked up a campaign demanding police accountability and reform of the laws affecting migrant workers. Before the unprepared system monitors could react, an avalanche was in motion. Tens of thousands of Chinese became involved in a national conversation, despite the risk of punishment. Emboldened, the mainstream media jumped in and reported the Sun case. The government opted not to crack down on these violations, rightly sensing that doing so would have been more politically costly then letting the debate run its course. A few months later, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao abolished the law requiring China's 120 million migrants to have special identity papers. (Singapore, with just 2.4 million regular Internet users and very deep pockets, might have a chance at quelling Internet-fueled popular revolts. But China comprises a fifth of humanity. Any attempt to impose iron-fisted control over a network this big seems certain to trigger economic paralysis.)

Since the Sun case, dissent has regularly roiled the Internet in China. Last year, 13 retired senior officials, including Chairman Mao's former secretary, protested a decision to close down a liberal weekly. In a joint letter published online, they wrote that the government suffered from the "delusion that it can keep the public locked in ignorance." The weekly was reopened.

This year, the pace of protests has increased. In March, the government provoked an outcry online by banning eight controversial books. Their authors published petitions — widely emailed and blogged — criticizing Long Xinmin, the chief censor. Within a few weeks their books were returned to shop shelves, an unprecedented move. Long defended the necessity of censorship, saying, "Advanced network technologies such as blogging and webcasting have been mounting new challenges to the government's ability to supervise the Internet." A month later, Long was fired. Hu Fayun, one of the eight temporarily banned authors, told The Times of London: "The traditional no-talk' style of control by the government has been broken by the Internet. Different voices can be found there."

Why can't the government block coverage of Lai and other sensitive subjects? Besides the seemingly insurmountable technical challenges, one important answer is this: online business. Rigorously policing encryption technology would undermine ecommerce, which is vitally important to the government's crusade to lift the economy. If all encrypted credit card details and other sensitive corporate information had to pass through surveillance bottlenecks, whole sections of the economy would be harmed. When forced to choose, the government seems to trust that raising incomes is a better way of securing power than spying on dissidents.

Of course, China is hardly a Jeffersonian paradise. Thousands languish in prison because of harmless online activities. A recent example is Zhang Jianhong — blogging as Li Hong — who was sentenced to six years for posting political essays. Cases like his justify strong criticism of China. But they don't prove that its monitoring system is successful on a national scale. Furthermore, the government is increasingly relying on physical rather than electronic surveillance. Internet cafs are now required to write down the ID numbers of all users so police can track them down no matter how clever their online disguises. But again, there are physical limits. Police cannot chase after millions of Internet caf&233; visitors.

Today, anyone in China can send a sensitive message if they are minimally savvy, and that fact is transforming the political discourse. True, technology has not led to the overthrow of the Communist Party, as some had predicted — the party has even harnessed the Internet for its own purposes. But this does not mean that Beijing has insulated itself against political change driven by technology. Its critics have unfettered access to mass communications, and the Internet — not the Communist Party — is the main influence on public opinion. No shield, golden or otherwise, can protect them from the public. China's leaders should know this. Their predecessors built the Great Wall of China to keep out Mongol invaders. It proved as useful as every other fixed fortification in history, and the Mongols still invaded Beijing and overthrew the political elite.

Oliver August (www.oliveraugust.com) is the author of Inside the Red Mansion: On the Trail of China's Most Wanted Man.

Facebook has filed a lawsuit against a Canadian porn company alleging that they attempted to hack Facebook’s servers.

Istra Holdings Inc trading as Slickcash is alleged to have tried to access Facebook’s servers at least 200,000 times in an attempt to access the personal information of Facebook users.

Facebook users though have nothing to fear, as according to court documents “These requests for information from Facebook generated error messages and were detected as unauthorized attempts to access and harvest proprietary information.”

一切都在预料之中.
今天早晨看Toronto Star,l里面有句话说"If you say 2006 is the year of YouTube, then 2007 is the year of Facebook." 所谓人怕出名猪怕壮, 枪打出头鸟,都是这个意思.  facebook被hack,放在三个月前,这就被我预料到了(偶也不是预言家,根据谚语,已经成为定律),所以有点小小意料中的意外.不过最终还是来了.
 让你一切私人信息暴露在整个互联网上,让人肆意践踏,不知道你怎么想. 所以我到现在也没有facebook帐号,谢天谢地,顶着压力还是过来了. 当然,不要以为FB就经历这么些小hack就算完事了,更大的风浪还在后头. 如果你之前addicted into facebook, 现在是时候浪子回头. 可以介绍你看一篇叫"Facebook suicide: the end of a virtual life"的通讯.

如果说Social Network是Web通向未来的桥梁,那么security就是坚固的桥墩, 基础设施还是很关键的.

某天，经理带领数位同事到某县做市场调研，问某个正在网吧里上网的人：“请问你知道Google吗？”

　　答曰：“知道。”

　　追问：“知道这家公司做什么的吗？”

　　答曰：“不太清楚。”

　　再追问：“请问你知道百度吗？”

　　肯定地答曰：“知道。”

　　再次追问：“知道做什么的吗？”

　　坚定地答曰：“找歌的。”

　　再次追问：“知道QQ吗？”

　　无比坚定而愤怒地答曰：“你骂人呢？”

　　最后一次追问：“那你知道ICQ吗？”

　　怀疑：“盗版的吧？”

如此幽默的笑话其实也是实情,不知道是原创的悲哀还是本土的胜利.

p.s. QQ的低端路线走的可谓深入人心,提高全国底层文化素质的重任托付给腾讯还是有一定现实意义的,

公司做大了,气量变小了.现在的微软对google可谓无可奈何恨之入骨.前两天听说为防止自己关键员工跳槽google,增加很多手段.现在的最新消息又出来, 说是在windows live passport里无法使用gmail作为passport ID. 这又让我想起国内SB公司腾讯,每天不骂一次腾讯心里就痒, 打个比方,想使用即使通讯窗口跟某个QQ用户交谈,一你必须使用IE,二你必须事先安装QQ. 同时满足两个条件才可以进行所谓即时交流,请问腾讯你知道什么叫”即时”吗?这里才是真正即时的定义.

回到今天的主题,假如连一个业界领头人也为蝇头小利斤斤计较,那鸟瞰整个战场各自为营上不得台面的明争暗斗怪现象也已不足为奇.

Via neowin